38 posts categorized "Risk Management"

17 November 2009

Views on Fair Value...

Busy week last week for events in London, this time over at the Goodacre / Six Telekurs on Thursday morning. Guy Sears of the IMA was chair of the event, and the event did have a "buy-side" focus to it. Richard Newbury of Six Telekurs started the event and made the following points on the current state of regulation:

  • UCITS IV - Richard cited the stats that there are around 37,500 funds in the EU with average value of approximately $180M each as compared to only 8,000 funds in the US with average value over $1B. Richard said that such a proliferation of funds was costly and the more EU could standardise funds and their ability to be transacted everywhere in the EU the better.
  • Reg NMS - Richard took a little humorous dig at US regulators when he reminded us that Congress authorised the SEC to form a "National Markets System" in 1975 and so this had taken around 30 years to implement. Whilst Reg NMS is often compared to MiFID, he said that Reg NMS had led to consolidation in the US while obviously MiFID has led to fragmentation in the EU.
  • Hedge Funds - Both EU and US regulators are looking at the hedge fund industry. He mentioned the battle the UK was having with some of the (misguided?) regulation that the EU is trying to introduce with over 30,000 HF related jobs in London. The new regulation is likely to increase reporting requirements leading to more need for regular, standardised fair value reporting.
  • Credit Rating Agencies - Richard mentioned how there will be more ratings and more ratings types, and the regulation introduced to ensure the CRA do not fall into the conflict of interest trap.
  • Data Management - He mentioned the importance of data management within what is happening in the industry and noted how the profile of data management was on the increase.

Mike Jenkins of Ernst & Young tried his best to make the accountancy treatment of derivatives interesting and didn't do too bad an effort but I only took the following few notes from his talk:

  • Unlike US GAAP with FAS 157 there is no single standard Fair Value (FV) definition in IFRS, and unsurprisingly IASB are addressing this.
  • Mike spent some time mentioning Level 1(quoted), Level 2 (observable) and Level 3 (unobservable) pricing inputs for securites, taken from the IASB exposure draft ED/2009/5 (also see Rowe in earlier post)

Matthew Cox of BoNY Mellon Security Services then gave his presentation on the difficulties/challenges of providing a valuation service to their asset management clients:

  • His division often have a "2 hour" window to produce valuations for NAV reporting, often for a 12 midday valuation
  • Data exceptions for investigation went through the roof this year due to increased volatility (comment: didn't get chance to ask whether the validations set were "normalised" for market volatility i.e. a price movement threshold would not be fixed but rather be multiplied by a factor relating to recent volatility levels)
  • Matthew was very complimentary about the efforts his team put in to cope with this increase in data exceptions.
  • He mentioned how many of his clients of established "Fair Value Committees" over the past couple of years, comprised of staff from compliance, risk management, portfolio management etc.
  • Matthew mentioned the importance of time zones in valuation and the timeliness of data, with the availability of intraday CDS prices contrasting with bonds who price only from the evening close of the day before.

The panel debate was moderated by Guy Sears, and included the above speakers plus Nigel Reynolds from TD Waterhouse):

  • Matthew said that his division sometimes shared the "consensus" price from other clients when one client is looking for some guidance.
  • He mentioned that a key timeframe in establishing FV was establishing what is a "reasonable" time frame for sale of a security.
  • Nigel Cox said that "suspended stocks" had been a real issue over the past year, where the client "context" (position, situation etc) would very much determine what value a client would want assigned to a holding.
  • Guy Sears suggested that valuations should be provided with a confidence interval and not just as a single price
  • Mike of E&Y said that this is what full disclosure now requires, other memberrs of the panel suggested this was realistic but not what clients (humans?) expect to receive - they want a single number.
  • Guy wondered whether it was an issue that one entity might value an asset at a value X whilst another would value the liability at Y (not equal to X)
  • Mike of E&Y pointed out that this was an issue in that current accountancy rules allow a security to be reclassified from "fair value" pricing to "historic cost" basis - this discretion is being removed in future rule implementations
  • One member of the audience pointed out that Bloomberg, Reuters and Markit were all trying to extract more revenue from data used for valuation purposes.
  • Matthew advocated that the market needed more competition between niche data vendors such as Markit and SuperDerivatives to ensure innovation in service and more competitive pricing.
  • The audience asked Guy of the IMA whether the association should have offered more guidance on fair valuation process and best practice.
  • Guy said they have provided some, but he advocated that trade associations should not have opinions, since it was not healthy to have the asset management industry collectively herding towards the same valuations.

Well attended event with some good speakers, particularly Guy Sears as host was funny, knowledgeable and kept the other speakers on their toes. I would say the most interesting point was still that "opinions" form prices, opinions formed in the investment/funding "context" of the party with an interest in valuing a security - conceptually this seem to make the asset servicing companies a little uncomfortable since what they are contracted to do is to provide the "right" set of numbers by their clients. Human beings feel more comfortable fixating on a single number than a range of possible outcomes/results it would seem!...

12 November 2009

It's in the news...

I went along to the Forum on News Analytics over in Canary Wharf on Monday evening, organised by Professor Gautam Mitra from OptiRisk / Carisma at Brunel University. We seem to be in the early days of transforming news articles into quantifiable/machine-readable data so that it can be processed automatically/systematically in trading and risk management. It was a good event with both vendors and practititioners attending so was reasonably balanced between vendor hype and the current state of market practice.

As background on what is meant by news analytics data, then for example you might count the number of news articles about a particular company and look at whether the quantity of news articles might be a predictor of some change in the company's stock price or volatility. Moving on from this simple approach (assuming that you are clever enough to be certain about what news is about what company), then you can then move towards assessing whether the news is negative, neutral or positive in sentiment about a company/stock.

The context here is about having the capability to automatically process/analyse any kind of text-based news story, not just those from research analysts that might be nicely tagged with such quantifiers of sentiment (see http://www.rixml.org/ on xml standards for analyst data). The way in which the meaning of the text is "quantified" uses some form of Natural Language Processing.

The event started with a brief talk by Dan di Bartolemeo of Northfield Information Services. I hadn't heard of him or his company before (maybe I should pay more attention!) but he seemed a very solid speaker with strong academic and practical background in investment management and modelling. He referenced a few academic papers (available via their web site) on news analytics, and how news analytics and implied volatility could provide better estimates of future volatility than implied volatility alone. He also made some good points about how investment "models" are calibrated to history and how such models need to adapt to "today" - he put it as "how are things different now from the past?" and put forward the idea of a framework for assessing and potentially modifying a model to respond to the "now" situation. He also suggested that the market can react very differently to "expected news" (having a range of investment "what ifs" planned for a known earnings announcement) as opposed to unexpected information (we are back into the realms of the Black Swan and the ultimate in uncertainty wisdom from Donald Runsfeld)

Armando Gonzalez of RavenPack then began by explaining how RavenPack had become involved in applying text analysis to finance (it seems the subject has its origins, like a lot of things, in the military). RavenPack seem to be highest profile quantified news vendor at the moment, and whilst Armando is obviously biassed towards pushing the concept that money can be made by adding quantified news data to trading models, he said that not many firms are as yet systematically processing news and most people are relying upon manual interpretation of the news they buy/use. Some of the studies Ravenpack have on market news and prices are very interesting, showing how a news event can take up to 20 mins before the market settles on a new "fair" price level for a stock. Additionally, and maybe an interesting reflection on human behaviour, was that in bull markets there are usually twice as many positive stories about companies than negative, but strikingly in a bear market there was still almost equal amounts of positive and negative news - so humans are basically optimists! (or delusional, or just plain greedy...take your pick!)

Mark Vreijling of Semlab followed Armando and suggested that a lot of their sales prospects understandably desire "proof" of the benefits of adding quantified news to trading, but this was a little ironic since most financial institutions have been paying to receive "raw" news for years, presumably because they perceive beneift from it. Mark also mentioned that the application of quantified news to risk management was a new but growing area for him and his colleagues.

Gurvinder Brar of Macquarie then went into some of the practicallities of quantifying and using news in automated trading. He suggested that you need to understand what is really "news" (containing information on something that has just happened) and what is merely an news "article" (like a "feature" in a magazine etc). Assessing relevance of news was also difficult and he added that setting a hierarchy of what kind of events are important to your trading was a key step in dealing with news data. Fundamentally he suggested that why wait for five days for analysts to publish their assessment of a market or company-specific event when you could react to the event in near real-time.

The event then went into "panel" mode where the following points came out:

  • Dan thought that a real challenge was integrating quantified news with all of the other relevant datasets (market data, but also reference data etc)
  • Armando picked up on Dan's point by giving the example news about Gillette which at one point was about Gillette the company but then on acquisition became news about the Gillette "brand" which became a part of Proctor and Gamble.
  • Dan said that a key problem with processing news was also understanding what news was simply ignored by the news wires i.e. we know what is being talked about, but what could have been talked about, why was it ignored and is it (even so) relevant to trading?
  • Mark and Armando said that the "context" for the news story was vital and that market expectations can turn many "negative" news stories into positive outcomes for trading e.g. the market likes bad news when it is not as "bad" as everyone thought.
  • Dan made a very interesting point about trading in terms of categorising trades as "want to" trades and "have to" trades. He gave the example of a trade being observed that seemingly has no news associated/prompting it - so does this mean the trade is occuring because somebody "has to" make the trade (a fund facing an welcome client redemption for example?) or because there has been some information leak to a market participant and such a participant "wants to" make a trade before the news becomes available to the market as a whole.
  • I think all of the panel members then collectively hesitated before answering the next question from the audience, with Microsoft having one of their "text search" R&D team (think Bing...) asking about news categorisation and quantification.
  • Dan also mentioned something that I have only recently become more aware of, which is that apart from major markets in the US, most exchanges world-wide do not publish whether a trade was a "buy" or "sell" trade (they just publish the price and transaction size). Obviously knowing the direction of the trade would be useful to any trading model, and Dan referred to this as wanting to know the "signed volume".
  • A member of the audience then asked whether most quantified news had been based on just the English language and the concensus was that most was based on English, but Natural Language Processing can be trained in other languages relatively easily. A few members of the panel pointed out that all languages change, even English, requiring constant retraining, and also that certain languages, countries and cultures added further complication to the recognition process.
  • The next question asked was whether the panel could outline the major areas that quantified news is applied in - the answer included intraday (but not quite real-time) trading, algorithmic execution, lower frequency portofolio rebalancing and in compliance/risk/market abuse detection.
  • A good debate ensued about whether "news" was provided by the official newswires or by the web itself. The panel (and audience) concensus seemed to favour the premise the news wires are the source of news and the web is a reflection/regurgitation of this news. That said, Gurvinder of Macquarie gave the nice counter example of the analysts/news wires not making much of the new Apple iPod, when looking at the web it was possible to see that the public were in contrast very enthusiastic about it.

Overall an interesting event. I think the application of "quantified news" to risk management is interesting - maths and financial theory is very interesting but markets are driven by people's behaviour and if "quantified news" can help us understand this better it has to help in avoiding (some!) of the future problems to be faced in the market.

21 October 2009

Integrated Data and Analytics Management

Xenomorph was one of the sponsors on the “Integrated Data Management” webcast last week, hosted by Inside Reference Data (audio recording available here). There were a number of interesting questions that arose from the Webinar.

One fundamental although somewhat academic question was "What is Integrated Data Management?". Certainly everyone seemed convinced that there would be less "Enterprise Data Management" (EDM) projects in future, given the expense, scope and scale of such projects. The concensus was that whilst the need for data management was better under stood across all financial institutions, data management projects would be bitten off in more manageable chunks by asset type, business function or division (so are silos back in fashion I ask myself?!). Coming back to the original question, I guess my slant on Integrated Data Management is that we are seeing more and more data management projects that have an integrated reference data and market data elements to them, primarily driven by the need to sort out data quality/completeness/depth for use within risk management (in light of the financial crisis).

Related to risk management, a topic I pushed was that given the origins of data management for STP/back office, and given the interest in low latency tick data management/analyis in the front office, there seems to be a market gap (particularly in the US?) on how to manage data such as IR/credit curves, volatility surfaces and other derived data sets. These data sets seem to fall into the gap between what is thought of as market data (primarily just prices) and what is reference data (IDs and terms & conditions). This is another area where a more integrated approach to data management would be beneficial, particularly in making all these datasets available for risk management.

Coming back to a "hobby-horse" of mine, then I also raised the issue that whilst it is fine to be doing great data management (high quality, complete datasets etc) what is the point if all of your data is ignored by the front office and Excel is used to download the data traders and risk managers need from Open Bloomberg. I think the management of unstructured data (spreadsheets, word docs etc) needs to be elevated as an issue since this (unfortunately?) is where most data resides currently, despite what we data management professionals like to think.

I also think that the principles of good data management (centralisation, quality and transparency) could apply to other things and not just raw "data", but what about centralised pricing and valuation, centralised curves and centralised scenarios for risk? Again what is the point of doing good data management if the ultimate "information" (e.g. a valuation) is done using poor quality data, with a complete lack of transparency over the data and model used.

A good question was asked about models, which was that given pricing models and their weaknesses have formed some part of the recent crisis, do we need more complex models. On having a few conversations about this and thought about it some more, then some would say it is complexity that got us into the crisis so this is the last thing we need. My view is that we do not necessarily need more complex pricing models and valuation techniques, but we certainly need more robust ones which does not necessarily imply more complexity. Coming back to a point raised by David Rowe previously, then I think all quants and risk managers should think about a "second means of valuation" for all the theoretical models they use, and that hedgeability (see recent post on pricing model validation) seems to be the common theme in producing more robust pricing models.


18 September 2009

Pricing Model Validation: Mitigating Model Risk

I managed to catch some of the day yesterday at the "Pricing Model Validation: Mitigating Model Risk" conference. I thought it would be worthwhile going along since firstly the past 12-18 months have made model risk very topical (take a look at previous posts from Riskminds, the Modeller's Manifesto and Wilmott/Rowe).

Secondly more of our clients are looking at managing and centralising pricing models/curve calculators in addition to just managing the underlying data (see this Insight Investment client case study for a recent public example). I am calling this "Analytics Management" which is the business-focussed technology stack that combines pricing models/calculators/analytics with all of the "Data Management" underneath. But enough of my thinly-veiled positioning statements...and on with some of the (hopefully) useful content from the conference outlined below - maybe scan the headings in bold below for those talks of interest but I would particularly recommend the ones by Tanguy Dehapiot and Yuyal Millo...

Model Risk 2009 defining and forecasting. First speaker was Professor Phillip Sibbertsen of the University of Hannover on defining and measuring model risk. Phillip started by saying that "Model Risk" was a new category of risk within the confines of "Operational Risk", and that operational risk as defined by the regulators does not yet currently include the "model risk" of market risk and credit risk, nor the "model risk" of the operational risk model itself. (I am sure I could write that up better!...). Phillip put forward that model risk is not formally a "risk" since it has no probability distribution and that he suggested it should be thought of as "model uncertainty". He also clarified that model risk applies both at the large, portfolio scale (e.g. choice of VAR model etc) and at the smaller, instrument level scale (i.e. pricing of derivatives).

Additionally in terms of measuring model risk then he excluded human failure from model risk measurement since in his view this was difficult to quantify - this approach did not meet with the approval of some of the audience were questioning how this could be excluded from a practical point of view. Phillip's colleague, Corinna Luedtke, then presented some work they had done on calibrating different GARCH models to observed data and showing how even a poor model could produce reasonable forecasts of risk if the time period was short. The work was interesting but again the audience highlighted that the human choice (failure?) in choosing the set of models to try was part of "model risk" and should not be excluded from the definition of model risk.

Is a model accurate? Testing the implementation of a model. Second speaker was David Chevance, Head of Equity & FX Model Validation at Dresdner Kleinwort. David outlined the different sorts of model risk: mathematical errors, missing risk factors, divergence from industry practice, model inconsistencies and implementation risk. He then outlined the sources of these risks: bugs, approximations, numerical precision, numerical boundaries and limitations on numerical methods (e.g. Sobol numbers in high dimension monte-carlo simulations).

David said a key area to start with in validating a model implementation was the front-office documentation of the product, its inputs and payoffs, its pricing model but also details of calibration methods used/needed etc. He made the point here that the documentation can sometimes specify just the deal, but sometimes can express the pricing methodology and pricing parameters. The emphasis was on completeness, accuracy and making use of all of the information available in the documentation. Obviously the ability to review the code used to implement the model was also necessary.

He discussed the trade-offs between a simple validation approach in terms of speed and efficiency of resources against the more time-consuming, resource hungry but more accurate approach of full replication of the model. He also suggested that in choosing a method of validation it was important to balance resource demands against what is actually being validated: payoffs from a single trade, a type of pricing model or a family of financial products. Desired accuracy of the validation was also important, given the trade-off between accuracy and effort, and the fact that small bugs are much more common than large.He finally discussed model version control, the necessary discipline of documenting changes and regression tests for new models, and the regular cycle of model review. Overall it was an interesting talk with a good practical focus.

Practical aspects of valuation model control process. One of the most entertaining and interesting speakers of the day was Tanguy Dehapiot, Head of Validation and Valuation, Group Risk Management at BNP Paribas. He started by referring to a few documents "Supervisory guidance for assessing banks’ financial instrument fair value practices", April 2009 (BCBS 153) which was then implemented within “Enhancement to the Basel II framework” (BCBS 157). The first part of his presentation was around these documents and what the regulators expect to be in place, so I guess the best approach is to read them (the BCBS 153 document content is only 12 pages long, quite short for a regulator!)

Tanguy pointed out that in his view "Mark to Market" and "Mark to Model" are often misleading as both are often required. He prefers the term "Valuation Methodology". He proposed four valuation modes: Direct Price Quotation, Use of Similar Instruments, Risk Replication, Expected Uncertain Cashflows (NPV) and categorised a useful hierarchy/matrix of which financial products fit into which valuation mode and for what purposes. Within model risk, he split off judgemental errors (choice of model etc) as part of market risk and credit risk and operational errors (model implementation and coding) as more definable and avoidable parts of operational risk.

He had some interesting slants on data, saying that he had been surprised that even getting all of the static data necessary to price simpler instruments like bonds had proven difficult. He outlined how model parameters are often stored across a variety of systems (curve definitions in one place, pricing methodology somewhere else) implying to me that this is sometimes difficult to pull together and needs some centralisation to improve transparency around this.

His opinion on market parameters (both observed prices and derived data such as implied volatility surfaces) were often stored in a larger central database but warned that this market parameter database needs to be reviewed as part of the model validation process since some of its data is derived (i.e. calculated, maybe using a model!) and as such should not be taken as perfect for all time and for all purposes. He said that it was important to categorise the origin of data and suggested the following types:

  • Quoted on an active exchange
  • Actual private transaction in an active market
  • Tradable broker quotes
  • Consensus prices from market makers
  • Non-binding indicative prices from market makers
  • Counterparty valuation, collateral valuation
  • Actual transactions in inactive market

Tanguy proposed that there should a valuation matrix for each instrument, where there might a different valuation methodology used for end of day valuation verses intraday, for risk or for trading, for pricing individually or within a portfolio reval. I guess here the rational is appropriateness, efficiency and transparency about what needs to used when. He also added that he disliked the term "Model Validation" since it seemed to imply that a model was "valid" and preferred "Model Approval" to cover the decision to use a model and "Model Review" to cover model analysis. He said he found managing the "stock" of existing models (and keeping up with when to review them) more difficult than managing the "flow" of new models and products.

Overall Tanguy was a very interesting and funny speaker with lots of practical insights and a fair amount of opinion thrown in, which is always good in my view.

The usefulness of inaccurate models: Financial risk management "in the wild". This talk was given by Dr Yuval Millo of the London School of Economics and he focussed on the evolution of the use of the Black Scholes Merton (B-S-M) model at the CBOE and how the model came to be the means by which the whole options market "communicated". Yuyal is a social scientist and prefaced his talk by stating that "Social Sciences are good at predicting the past"

First thing I didn't know (amongst the many things I do not know...) is that the B-S model was not published until a couple of weeks after the CBOE started trading stock options in April1973. Yuyal said that initially the B-S-M derived prices were not accurate at all (around 25% off the market price on CBOE) and that the model was based on assumptions that plainly were not the case on the exchange (only calls available, no short selling, no continuous trading). The model was used by local Chicago trading firms and the story goes that Fischer Black sold large paper "sheets" of option pricing matrices to these traders (there being no calculators/PCs/mobiles around at the time).

As the markets developed, larger East Coast banks entered the market with stocks being held and traded in New York and options being traded in Chicago, so trading became geographically dispersed. This started the need for "early morning meetings" to discuss the market and the B-S-M model and its parameters became the "lingua franca" or means of communication of options market participants.

He described the first years of the Options Clearing Corporation (OCC) which was set up to ensure that the financial obligations of options and buyers were met. Around 1979-80 the OCC worked overnight to calculate margin requirements, based on the (now?) arcane idea that different margin amounts should be associated with different option strategies (straddles, butterflies etc) and the job of the OCC was to take a portfolio of Option and optimise which combination of strategies would minimise the margin required for the whole portfolio. He said that there were disputes between traders and the OCC around margin levels and difficulties for the SEC with updating their Net Capital Rules as each new option strategy was created. Eventually, the OCC adopted the B-S-M model and implied volatility as the means of calculating margin against market value which enabled them to move away from the operational difficulty of strategy optimisation.

So the B-S-M became the way in which traders communicated about the market but also the model became vital operationally within clearing for the market. By 1987 B-S-M had become the de-facto standard for the market, with the model driving the market in turn driving use of the model. During the Oct '87 crash the model proved to be very innaccurate but the use of the model did not diminish - maybe pschologically the market participants needed a model (even a wrong model) to make communication easier.

I found this talk very interesting and members of the audience asked whether any similar analysis was going to be done on the Gaussian Copula model used to price CDOs. Yuyal said that one of his colleagues was undertaking this research currently. Given that he seemed to be very positive about the use of the B-S-M model within options markets I asked whether he had any opinions on Taleb's criticism of fiancial engineers and modelling. Yuyal said that he and Nassim were friends and agreed to disagree on certain topics...

Stress testing modelling parameters. Next up was Peirpaolo Montana, Head of Model Validation at West LB. Having joined the finance industry out of a career in mathematics and then at a regulator, Pierpaulo began by saying that back in the heady days of 2004 the banks thought that their own risk management systems and practices were well ahead of the regulators. He said that in light of the crisis this proved not to be the case but he now feels that this is now more evenly balanced (not sure I would agree, still lots of catchin to do for some institutions I would suggest).

He said that whilst regulators require the validation of risk models and pricing models, and that stress testing of a portfolio is required, that the stress testing of a pricing model is not a requirement and has received much less attention and in his view was not done to much degree before 2007. His point here was that pricing models should work under stress too, otherwise they are a weak foundation for building other risk measures such as stressed VAR.

Whilst focussing on pricing models, he mentioned that risk models also need to be carefully chosen and appropriate to the institution and the types of trading activities it undertakes. As an example he put forward that a simple VAR calculator might be appropriate for a long only equity fund but completely innappropriate for a relative value portfolio.

He said that stress testing had recently received much more attention as a risk management tool and cited the BIS document "Revisions to the Basel II market risk framework" where stressed VAR is introduced as part of the regulatory capital charge calculation. He also mentioned that in order to avoid "standard model" treatment of complex securitised products an institution must be able to demonstrate that its VAR model can cope with these products under times of market stress.

Pierpaulo then described the stress testing of base correlation in CDO pricing, and how even moving the base correlation from its usual level of 70% to 99% would not have predicted the valuations observed in the recent crisis. In this way he says that stress testing of models can detect implementation problems and some model weaknesses, but it cannot assist in coping with structural breaks in the market. He also discussed how the B-S-M model is used everywhere (even places it should not really be valid for) since it is a robust model based on the no-arbitrage hypothesis - in contrast the CDO base correlation and other models are not so robust since they are not arbitrage free.

(end of post!)
 


 

15 July 2009

Regulatory moves and moods

Seems that the latest EU and Basel Committee proposals on banking regulation cannot make everyone happy (now there's a surprise...). Whilst many seem very happy at the incremental nature of the proposals to increase capital requirements for securitisations and proprietary trading, some of those in the Glass-Stiegal/banking utility camp are less than impressed. I am with the incremental camp myself, but have to acknowledge that the sceptics are not short of ammunition when saying that we are heading back to the future...meanwhile over in hedge fund land, London is currently in a very bad mood with the EU...

Debt hides volatility from Taleb

Nassim Nicholas Taleb and one of his colleagues are back in the FT today with an article on the "evils" of debt and why the only solution to the economic system's woes is (start the fanfare, this is scary stuff!) the "immediate, forcible and systematic conversion of debt to equity". The main points of the article are that:

  • Debt and leverage lead directly to fragility in the system whereas equity is robust at absorbing extreme variations in the system.
  • The economic system is experiencing more extreme events (more "Black Swans") than ever before rendering mainstream economic forecasting useless.
  • Debt hides volatility as a loan does not vary outside of default whereas an equity investment has volatility but its risk is more visible and as a result more manageable.

I think the last point on debt hiding volatility is quite profound - on a personal basis I would put it into the category of one of those things that you know but it becomes clearer when expressed in a different way, usually (in my case!) by somebody else. Its implications are illustrated particularly well in the following extract from the text:

"Thus debt is the province of both the overconfident borrower who underestimates large deviations, and of the investor who wants to be deluded by hiding risks."

The article is dramatic (as is usual with Taleb, see post) and short on detail of how such a fundamental conversion of debt to equity should happen from a practical point of view. It is nonetheless thought-provoking, particular around the use of flawed economic models being used to get us out of a crisis that the underlying maths helped us to get into, and the consequent proposal that we shouldn't try to model and control the risks of the system but instead endorse equity as the defensive, stabilising shock-absorber of choice. Maybe I should call my insurance broker, I think I need to increase my cover...

03 July 2009

Lessons for Risk Management - Wilmott and Rowe

Great event organised by PRMIA and IAFE last night at Goldman's London offices with a long title:

 "A Little Thought Goes A Long Way and Lessons for Risk Management from the Current Crisis".

The event was moderated by Giovanni Bellossi of FGS Capital, and featured speaking slots by Paul Wilmott and David Rowe of Sungard. Here are my notes on the evening, please forgive any innaccuracies, and please persevere through some of the techy quant stuff, as their general points are well worth understanding.

  • Giovanni quoted from Nassim Taleb about how VAR is invalid and that mainstream financial mathematics should be banned (or words to that effect, see earlier post on Taleb)
  • He added that whilst what Taleb says cannot be ignored, he said that despite the current crisis and its causes that we should not "throw the baby out with the bathwater" and added that Taleb "...is not only able to recognise a cow but also knows how to milk one."

  • Giovanni said that financial mathematics has much to offer and that whilst VAR is simply a number, one of its great benefits has to make one measure of risk simple and compelling enough to get traders and risk managers talking.

Paul Wilmott then took the floor and put forward his thoughts:

On Taleb and the Black-Scholes Model

  • Paul mentioned that he and Taleb were great friends, and whilst he agreed with much of what Taleb says he has areas of disagreement, particularly over the use of the Gaussian distribution in finance and its implications for "fat tail" events
  • Paul Googled "Taleb" and found more entries for Taleb than for Stephen Hawkin which shows how much attention had come his way due to the "Black Swan" debate
  • He thinks that he and Taleb are the "Marmite of finance" (for those of you not in the UK who do not know Marmite, it is a sandwich spread that you either love or hate, never anything inbetween)
  • He suggested that every quant needs a much more fundamental and practically grounded understanding of financial mathematics.
  • Paul refered to some work (mentioned by Giovanni) that Peter Carr of Bloomberg had done on discrete daily hedging that showed that this option replication technique could remove up to 85% of the risk and that all quants should know about this 15% error term when trying to calculate an option price to the Nth decimal place.
  • He described how in the past he had set up a volatility arbitrage hedge fund, wanting to improve upon the flawed assumption of the Black-Scholes (B-S) model that volatility is constant and to build the world's best volatility model for option pricing.
  • Paul said that he did build the world's best volatility model (?!), but soon found it took too long to calculate, so he reverted back to B-S and has become an unfashionable fan of the model and its assumptions.
  • He added that many of the variants on B-S to overcome its limitations have made the model worse and harder to calibrate.
  • In some part due to Taleb's opinions on fat tails of distributions, B-S and other models are now very unpopular but Paul claims that not many people have actually bothered to robustly test the B-S model or take a practical, evidence based approach such as that adopted by Peter Carr.
  • Paul then showed some example charts and said that with a limited number of opportunities for regular time-period hedging it was not valid to use risk-neutral pricing whereas if the same number of hedges could be used optimally (implying at irregular time periods) then risk-neutral was valid and hedging could be more effective. He emphasised that this was the kind of practical stuff that a quant should know and that quants show know less about esoteric complex financial mathematics.

Correlation

  • Paul said that of all of the issues that need addressing in mathematical finance, the one that he has very few answers on is correlation.
  • He showed that even basic questions about correlation are poorly understood, even by quants - a question he asks some quants was that if two asset prices both start out at 100, and they have a correlation (of returns) of 1 (perfect correlation) what is the price of the second asset after a year if the first moves to 200. The answer is not 200, and he showed how assets could diverge in overall direction but still have a correlation of 1 or rise together with a perfect negative correlation of -1.
  • Paul illustrated how correlation was a very blunt measure that is mis-used by people to summarise the highly complex and historically unstable relationships between assets driven for example by industry sector success (leading to +ve correlation) or competitive success (leading to -ve correlation)
  • As a result, he said that financial products whose value depends on correlation should not be transacted in any great size and moved on to the example of CDOs, where a CDO with 1,000 underlying mortgages has been modelled with 1/2 million correlations all assumed to be 0.6. Why this assumption should be made was his main point.

Sensitivity to Parameters

  • His main point here was that a constant should not be varied, otherwise it is not a "constant", in particular focussing on volatility used in the B-S model and the calculation of Vega as prices are moving.
  • Paul added that sensitivity measures may apply locally and is such may look comparible from one situation to another, but quants need to understand how outputs respond over a wider range of inputs, and not to be inhibited by accepted practices and beliefs.

Complexity

  • Models need to be robust and transparent, and that quants should aim for the mathematical sweet spot.
  • Paul put forward the following analogy that at least when driving an old car over a long distance, you knew that the car was likely to break down at least once, but you also knew that it was likely that you could fix it. Contrast this with driving a modern sports supercar and finding that it has (unexpectedly?) broken down - you don't know how to fix it, you do not complete your journey and it costs you an ordinate amount of money to put things right...

Self-Referential Feedback

  • Paul described here how the hedging of derivatives contracts in the underlying markets can cause price movements in underlying markets that cause derivatives contracts to re-price that cause more hedging in the underlying markets...
  • He was critical of credit derivative pricing as being too complex and too "mathsy" (...but had to admit that he had also endorsed some of this work at the time)

Calibration

  • Paul said that model parameter calibration is the devil's work...
  • He refered us to inverse problems in mathematics as a background to this issue in mathematical finance.
  • He emphasised how markets and price behaviour is fickle and driven by human opinions and behaviours
  • He said that on-going and regular re-calibration of a model is very, very likely to mean that the model is wrong (he had a particular example of calibrating a particular model he hates where vol is a function of underlying price and time.

David Rowe, Sungard's specialist spokesman on risk management, then took over from Paul and set out his five topics for discussion:

  • Statistical Entropy - fundamentally that information can only be extracted from data, with the emphasis on extraction of information (from that already in the data) rather than creation of new information.
  • Structural Imagination - that we need to be aware of how the market assumptions we make are themselves a model and that we need to spend more time on thinking about what could happen outside our current understanding or market experience.
  • Self-Referential Feedback - the feedback loops in pricing, risk management and economics
  • Complexity and Dark Risk - when you add (untested) complexity of a model to limited data sets you get a recipe for disaster.
  • Alternate Means of Valuation - when the primary means of valuing a security is not available (illiquid markets anyone?) then what is the secondary means of calculation value.

Some further notes from David's talk:

  • AAA rating should imply a failing once every 10,000 years, with some super senior CDO tranches being rated as better than AAA - David pointed out that even as recently as the early 1990s there were problems in the US housing market that indicated that AAA did not mean what it was taken to mean.
  • On structural imagination, David said that quants and risk managers must look for unrepresented variables in a model and track them early to monitor their effects
  • On feedback he cited an example where increased returns drove product innovation which drove up (CDO) volumes, which caused underwriting standards to fall, that allowed further complexity, that then led to unreliable risk estimation which then led to more product innovation... and so on.
  • He suggested that quants adopt the "second means of valuation" mantra in a similar way to credit specialists always having the mantra when assessing credit of "what is the second means of repayment" (e.g. a lien on a house) when the primary means (mortgage payments) goes away.
  • David showed a nice classification from an IASB paper on classifying financial instruments:

Level 1: fair values measured using quoted prices in active markets for the same instrument.

Level 2: fair values measured using quoted prices in active markets for similar instruments or using other valuation techniques for which all significant inputs are based on observable market data

Level 3: fair values measured using valuation techniques for which any significant input is not based on observable market data

David additional proposed the interesting level of "Level ?" for some products, and said that obviously more attention needs to spent on Level 2 and 3 instruments under conditions of reduced (non-existant?) market liquidity.

Summary Session:

Paul and David then answered some questions from the audience:

  • Paul said that some risk managers lacked the imagination necessary for good risk management, being confined in standard procedures, beliefs and ways of doing things. He wants risk managers who are good at thinking laterally.
  • Paul said that risk management was often an afterthought, not part of the trading process.
  • David said that VAR has proven useful despite its weaknesses, in his opinion preventing failures from non-extreme events regardless of the recent extremes
  • David said that in answer to Taleb's criticism of using history in modelling, it quite frankly is all we have to go on. He quoted Mark Twain in that:

"History does not repeat itself but it does rhyme"

The talks were interesting, and even on points that have been discussed elsewhere both speakers had some interesting slants and good analogies. But maybe I am biassed, as the wine afterwards wasn't bad either!...


02 July 2009

Risk in the Hands of the Holder?

Given the ongoing debate about "too big to fail" and whether we should head back to the days of the Glass-Steagal Act, then here is a slightly different slant on the problem of systematic risk put forward in an article by Avinash D. Persaud.

In the article, Avinash makes the very good point that increasing capital requirements across the board is not the only response that regulators should consider, and that the risk of a financial product cannot be determined in isolation of who is holding it:

"At the heart of modern regulation is the erroneous view that risk is a quantifiable property of an asset. But risk isn't singular. There are credit, liquidity, and market risks, for instance—and different parts of the financial system have different capacities to hedge each. Thus, risk has as much to do with who is holding an asset as with what that asset is. The notion—popular in the U.S. Congress—that there are "safe" instruments to be promoted and "risky" ones to be banned is deceptive."

Obviously the last point is very relevant to the OTC markets at the moment. Avinash suggests that capital requirements should be tailored to what type of organisation is holding a risk and that organisations ability to hedge it, and outlines past mistakes made by regulators:

"By requiring banks to set aside more capital for credit risks than nonbanks must, regulators unintentionally encouraged banks to shift their credit risks to those who wanted the extra yield but had limited ability to hedge this type of risk. By not requiring banks to put aside capital for maturity mismatches, they encouraged banks to take on liquidity risks they couldn't offset. Moreover, by supporting mark-to-market asset valuations (which make institutions value holdings at their current price) and short-term solvency requirements, regulators discouraged insurers and pension funds from taking the very liquidity risks they are best suited for."

On banks and credit risk, then for those interested there is a good regulatory arbitrage example for credit risk described in the following article. Fundamentally I think the paragraph above illustrates some of the reasons why it is right to worry about rushing in new regulation too quickly - certainly things need to change but when dealing with large and complex systems (i.e. in this case Financial Markets) changes should be introduced incrementally in order to understand how the system responds.

Given the political imperative to "do something" then regulators find it all too tempting to stick their noses in everywhere, even in areas that did not lead us to the current crisis - take for instance the regulatory initiatives over the past year in short selling, hedge fund regulation and more recently the dangers of "dark pools" (at least dark pools sound scary I guess?). Where will the next "bogey man" appear on the regulator's radar and what will be the unintended consequences of government pressure on regulators to keep us all "safe"?

30 June 2009

Risk as Sales Support?

Article in FTFM yesterday saying that the risk function is being ignored by asset managers when formulating new financial products.This seems consistent with some recent comments from one risk manager who said that their role was a lot to do with sales support i.e. to convince potential investors that the asset manager has good risk management capability. Given all the discussions on the sell side about the role of risk managers and the risk function, sounds like the debate should open out more onto the buy-side too.

22 May 2009

Liquidity Risk

Our think-tank friends at JWG-IT organised a great event yesterday, with several of the top banks coming together to share their thoughts on what is currently causing them the most pain in implementing the FSA liquidity risk requirements (see FSA Consultative Paper CP08/22 for background).

A few points I took from the meeting:

  • FSA is moving from a "principles" based approach to regulation to "outcomes" on to "proof of judgement" as the basis for assessing financial institutions
  • What liquidity stress tests the FSA wants the financial institutions to perform is still far from clear
  • The above uncertainty is not helping when combined with an implementation deadline of this October
  • Whether liquidity risk must be managed at the branch or group level is a key unanswered question which has enormous implementation implications
  • The data requirements are enormous and since a group-wide issue requirements greater central access to data across all departments - unlike traditional market risk which is currently more siloed within each business division
  • The granularity of data required (down to transactions, detailed cashflows for complex derivatives) is very challenging
  • Management of intraday liquidity requires real-time cash transaction reporting which is currently not being done/is difficult to do
  • "Ownership" of liquidity risk implementation typically resides within a bank's treasury function but awareness, ownership and involvement of all departments (e.g. market risk) could be greatly  improved

A lot more interesting issues and detail on this meeting plus survey results will be available from JWG-IT soon (see their liquidity risk site)

08 May 2009

Data Quality and the Future of Risk

A new survey from the Economist Intelligence Unit (sponsored by SAS) of over 300 financial institutions world-side has put data quality and availability as a key issue to be resolved if risk management is to be fit for purpose following the financial crisis:

"Culture, expertise and data are weak points in current risk management"

A summary of the survey report is available here.

06 May 2009

Less risk on the buy-side?

Interesting but counter-intuitive survey results discussed on the Advanced Trading blog, suggesting that risk function has lost status at buy-side institutions.

08 April 2009

High Performance Spreadsheets

Another article about the operational risk generated by the usage of spreadsheets within the financial markets (see earlier posts), appeared in the April issue of Waters Magazine.
 
The articles highlights how spreadsheets are largely used within financial institutions and suggests that the current regulation requirements for more transparency and ad-hoc risk management might push the proliferation of spreadsheets even further. The articles also refers to the progress and improvements made by Microsoft in recent versions of Excel to increase the security of spreadsheets.
 
Xenomorph has worked closely with Microsoft on hosting its time series database within SQL Server 2008. The case study we have written together describes how SQL Server 2008 offers integration within Office Excel 2007 so that whilst the spreadsheet is still the end-user viewing tool, operational risk is reduced by engaging Excel 2007 as an analytics and reporting tool and not as a mean of storing data.
 
Our TimeScape solution offers more than 700 easy to use add-in functions to Office Excel 2007 and we are currently working on the use of Excel Services, part of Microsoft Office Share Point Server 2007, to further enhance the centralized approach to spreadsheet.
 
If you are interested in how Xenomorph solves the problem of spreadsheet management, then take a look at our (newly updated) website. Here we explain how to solve the problem and how Xenomorph Spreadsheet Inside technology can bring unstructured spreadsheet data and complex calculation within a centralized data management system, increasing transparency and reducing operational risk.

30 March 2009

Capital requirements for Asset Managers

Article in the FT today saying that the Financial Services Authority (FSA) has criticised asset managers for poor risk management, and that these failures might force it to impose higher capital requirements on some institutions.

The Investment Management Association (IMA) countered by saying that the FSA guidelines on capital requirements for asset managers were unclear, but also added that as asset managers did not hold client-owned assets on their balance sheets they did not need to hold capital against these assets unlike the banks.

I understand this last point by the IMA, but surely given an institutions fees (aka revenues) derive mainly from fees for managing these assets, surely the IMA is not doing itself any favours by effectively suggesting that the (currently volatile) value of these assets are not relevant from a institutional risk point of view? Poor investment performance leads to redemptions, leads to reduced fees, leads to concerns over institutional stability, leads to more redemptions etc, etc.

Anyway, interesting that this is receiving some regulatory attention and maybe buy-side risk management will soon be moving beyond helping to market and sell the latest investment product...

23 February 2009

Regulatory Camouflage

My faith in government institutions and the people working for them has been restored by Martin Wolf of the FT when he pointed out an excellent paper "Why Banks Failed the Stress Test" by Andrew Haldane of the Bank of England. Reading this is a complete contrast to my experience at the FSA presentation on stress and scenario testing the other week (see earlier post).

The paper ends by putting forward five proposals for improving risk management:

  • Better Scenario Definition - Regulators defining multi-factor scenarios for the industry that are truly representative of extreme tail events.
  • Regular Scenario Evaluation - A common set of scenarios evaluated and reported upon to the regulators on a regular basis.
  • Second-Round Stress - Making sure that the consequencies of stress testing for individual institutions can be evaluated for system-wide risk.
  • Active Management of Risk - Ensuring that management take and can explain actions that provision for the risks identified, and do not simply passively report on risk levels.
  • Transparency - Access to institutional stress testing results by regulators and potentially by the market as a whole through annual report and accounts.

In addition to solid content, Andrew Haldane writes a good story, and I love the usage of "regulatory camouflage" in the serious point below:

"...is that stress-testing was not being meaningfully used to manage risk. Rather, it was being used to manage regulation. Stress-testing was not so much regulatory arbitrage as regulatory camouflage."

20 February 2009

A lottery of bonuses

Another application in an FT article of the long-dated option strategy (see earlier post) this time to discredit the UK Government's attempts to limit the risk of the short-term bonus culture in financial markets. The article is funny and makes a lot of sense, but the need to "do something" for the outraged public will unfortunately mean that not many politicians will take any note of it.

13 February 2009

Data management, derivative analytics and the spreadsheet

Interesting article out doing the rounds on the newswires announcing a forthcoming report called "The Enterprise Spreadsheet: Pushing towards Transparency" by the analyst firm the Tabb Group. It is great to see an analyst firm acknowledging the importance of spreadsheets within the markets, particularly in the area of combining data and analytics together in OTC derivatives management (see earlier post).

Adam Sussman of the Tabb Group reckons that despite its shortcomings, Excel is a valuable tool: “Spreadsheets, either alone or in conjunction with other components, can meet the same requirements as a business application.” In this he seems to be agreeing with the UK Regulator the FSA, who have been recently advocating that spreadsheets and spreadsheet data needs actively managing as an institutional resource. The findings of the Tabb Group on management also seem to echo a recent report called "Buy-Side Data Management in a Changing Landscape" done by Lepus for Asset Control (registered link to report here).

Spreadsheets are a great tool and fulfil a real need in the market to pull together pricing models and data quickly, easily and with a timeframe that is meaningful to the business (see earlier post for some work by Xenomorph in this area). Spreadsheets are a big problem to manage, but they are also the symptom of failings in core systems that are not able to rapidly support new instrument types and pricing models. An institution that ignores analytics, spreadsheets and spreadsheet data within any EDM transparency initiative has already failed before it begins, and so to paraphrase the author Aldous Huxley:

"Spreadsheets do not cease to contain data because they are ignored."

11 February 2009

The Respect Scenario from the FSA?

The presentation by the FSA last night on their consultative paper called "Stress and Scenario Testing (CP 08/24)" was a real disappointment last night. The presentation was at best average, not adding any more value than what you could get from scanning their paper. However, what was worse was the Q&A session at the end, with a variety of questions from the audience being answered by the FSA representative with "Thanks, that was a very good question and I will get back to you on it...".

The organisers (ISDA and PRMIA) had managed to get around 200 risk managers to attend which was an impressive turn-out with only standing room left as the event started. I would suggest if the FSA want more feedback from the industry it would be better if they would send someone along who is at least able to add value to the conversation. Their representative last night was doing his best but was just too junior, too inexperienced and lacked the confidence to answer questions in a meaningful manner.

Regulators are telling everyone to "raise the bar" on standards at the moment - they would find it helpful if they would apply this mantra to themselves and the people they put out as representing their views and expertise.

04 February 2009

The "Bubble Index" Cometh...

Seems like my idea of detecting and hedging against future economic price bubbles via a "bubble index" (see last paragraph of earlier post) is maybe not so stupid as I might have thought judging by a letter in the FT today. If only innovation were more popular at the moment, it might have commercial legs!

30 January 2009

Risk Proposal from Roubini

Article in the FT today by Lasse Pedersen and Nouriel Roubini (somewhat accurate predictor of some of our current problems) on regulatory captical and prevention of another crisis. Pedersen and Roubini say that current regulation focuses too much on individual bank risk and does not consider the systematic risk that could be caused by the failure of an individual bank. They propose the introduction of a new systemic capital requirement and systemic insurance programme, although in this article do not present too much detail on the mechanics of the "systemic risk" calculation. More detail can be found at their NYU Stern project on restoring financial stability.

23 January 2009

Underrated, Overrated

More flak for the ratings agencies in the FT today with the article "Warning: rating agencies can do you harm", suggesting that agencies have moved from under-assessing risk (and causing financial damage in the process) to now cautiously over-assessing risk (and causing financial damage in the process).

The recent downgrading of Greece, Spain, Portugal (and potentially Ireland) won't gain them any political friends in the EU review of their role in the markets - all recent news seems to lead to "tails you lose, heads you lose" for these institutions and points to further trouble ahead...

15 January 2009

Happy Birthday Spreadsheet!

Article on PCMag saying that the spreadsheet is 30 years old. Whilst wishing it a happy birthday, the author, John C. Dvorak, has a good rant about how spreadsheets have been the major weapon in the rise to power of the accountant in business.

Good job he did not spend too much time looking at their usage in financial markets or else his rant would have been much longer, given past issues with spreadsheets in financial markets. The spreadsheet (which means Excel at the moment) is a great tool that is:

  • a calculator;
  • a report writer;
  • a database

In my view it is the latter usage of desktop spreadsheets to store data where the problems mainly reside, not its usage as an analysis tool. Faced with inflexible trading and risk management systems that do not allow instrument and trade data to be represented quickly or correctly, it is unsurprising that traders, portfolio managers and risk managers resort to spreadsheets as the "pressure relief valve" for their business activities.

Delivering systems that can support both complex and non-standard instruments and trades in a transparent manner should be a focus in a world where that the lack of transparency over credit derivative pricing has been such an issue. The inappropriate usage of spreadsheets is a very small part of the current problems we are experiencing in the markets, but addressing this would be a positive step in creating a data management foundation that encompasses all data used by a financial institution, not just that data that is easy for software vendors to represent in their systems.

Anyway, enough of my spreadsheet hobby-horse, for some light relief and to celebrate 30 years of summing rows and columns, take a look at the Eusprig web site for a list of the most notable spreadsheet failures.

14 January 2009

Financial Modeler's Manifesto...

Echoing all of the recent focus on model risk at the RiskMinds event before Christmas (see earlier post), Emanuel Derman and Paul Wilmott have put together "The Financial Modeler's Manifesto" as their serious but amusing guide to how financial modeler's must conduct themselves in future.

I particularly like the self-effacing summary oath for financial model-makers everywhere:

The Modelers' Hippocratic Oath

~ I will remember that I didn't make the world, and it doesn't satisfy my equations. 

~ Though I will use models boldly to estimate value, I will not be overly impressed by mathematics.

~ I will never sacrifice reality for elegance without explaining why I have done so.

~ Nor will I give the people who use my model false comfort about its accuracy.
Instead, I will make explicit its assumptions and oversights.

~ I understand that my work may have enormous effects on society and the economy,
many of them beyond my comprehension.

 

Libor no more...

Following the ongoing story of Libor diverging from the OIS rate (see earlier post), Risk magazine reports that Libor risks losing its place as a funding benchmark. Spreads against the OIS have tightened recently (see recent article in the FT), but Mustafa Chowdhury, head of US interest rate research at Deutsche Bank in New York, says that Libor is becoming less relevant as a benchmark due to banks accessing other sources of funding such as Federal Reserve Funds.

Time to change all of those benchmark yield curves across the entire institution and understand all of the pricing differences? Ouch! Maybe wait a while yet...

11 December 2008

RiskMinds - DB on reforming the financial markets

Hugo Banziger, CRO of Deutsche Bank, gave a presentation on his ideas on how best to reform "The Global Financial Architecture".

He started by emphasing:

  • The economic imperative to resolve the current crisis for the benefit of all people, not just the financial markets.
  • That the current crisis is very close to the crisis of the 1930s (he did his PhD on the Great Depression, so he should probably know).
  • He has been involved in the rescue of 3 banks recently, and said that one major German financial institution was only 6 days away from insolvency before it was saved.
  • His opinion that letting Lehman go was a bad decision that has worsened the crisis.
  • That without goverment help the financial markets would have gone into meltdown and that this state of affairs is totally unacceptable for the industry.

He proposed action in three areas:

  • Monetary Policy - Governments and central banks should pay more attention to the interaction between monetary policy and global capital flows. Central bank policy should also consider targetting how to prevent asset price bubbles as well as more standard measures such as inflation (Comment: maybe my bubble index idea wasn't so stupid?). Emergency liquidity provision also needed a rethink in light of past failures.
  • Regulation and Supervision - Capital requirements should be increased and capital calculations need redesigning to reduce pro-cyclical aspects so as to provision in the good times for the bad (Spanish regulator had already done this apparently). Capital calculations should be calculated over longer time periods (30 yrs?) using the worst of events from the past. Scenarios need adding into the capital calculations so they are not just probabilistic in nature. Regulators should insist upon better transparency and disclosure, in particular on valuation methods and the methods of the Credit Rating Agencies. Ultimately, regulation needs be co-ordinated on a global basis given the global nature of the markets.
  • Private Insitutions (the Banks) - Appalled by the lack of integrated risk management at many banks, and clear governence of the risk is essential. IT systems should be robust and centralised access to data to calculate exposure is essential. A typical cost of $200m to implement Basel II indicates to him that basic technology infrastructure is not in place and good risk management cannot be being done. Having data in spreadsheets and reporting to regulators with a 3 month timeframe is not good enough and the industry needs to get the infrastructure in place to properly handle and report in a timely manner upon the risks it is taking. He proposes that each bank needs to get a diversified and stable funding base in place - DB issued long term funding recently to reduce dependence on short-term sources and has $65b in reserves, so (maybe at the risk of sounding smug) he believes DB is well positioned.

Interesting talk, Hugo risked coming across as a little smug in the presentation but did admit that DB had faced problems too (but just not as bad as most other institutions though!).

 


 


Xenomorph: data and analytics management

About Xenomorph

Xenomorph is the leading provider of data and analytics management solutions to the financial markets. Risk, trading, quant research and IT staff use Xenomorph’s TimeScape data and analytics management solution at investment banks, hedge funds and asset management institutions across the world’s main financial centres.

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